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Criminal Intent.
In all nations and in all times the criminal law
has been ir. a more rude and imperfect state than the.
civil. Even in Blackstone s time the most trivial
offences were severely punished,! A great ameliora-
tion of criminal law has taken place in England as
well as in hnerica during the last centu ry. To
account for the harsh and overreaching penalties suf-
fered for trivial offences is not difficult. The
cause liest in the 'impetuous dictates of avarice,
ambition and revenge; in the adoption of temporary
expedients on the spur of the moment and giving them
a lasting efficacy; in sanctioning penalties which
are commensurate with some unusuial and extraordinary
offence at the first recoil; in other words it is the
,york often of the theoretical reformer who swings the
penduhim from adjudged wrong to certain injuistice.
gririnal laws should then be made only with jealous
care, 'founde ... upon principles that ate permanent,
uniform and universal; and always conformable to the
dictates of truth and jiustice. '
In this ameliorating_ process n o . ..one essential of
crime has played so important a part as the determirx-
2ing of the intent with which the act wacr, done. In
tracing the parallel lines of civil and criminal
jurisprudence until they are lost in. reMote antiquity,
there is no mark of distinction or separation so
plainly visible as the necessity of intent in criminal
jurisprudence. In civil law the intent is often a
matter of importance and as oftnn disregarded; in
ever, it is of the highest importance
since in its absence, generally speaking, no crime is
possible.
In this treatise we shall, of necessity, discuss
criminal intent only in its restrictive sense. We
shall be satisfied with the general principles under-
lying intent and avoid the exceptions. For instance,
in stating the rule that a person intends the hatutal
and probable consequences of his act, person is meant
to be the ordinary, avercauge, sane and normal man free
from the disabilities of insanity, infancy, drunken-
ness duress etc.
As the first fu ndamnent an~3 underlying pr:inciple
of c riminal Jurisprudence then ,re have that no man is
guilty of any offence unless his intent was wrong.
It is embodied in t'he short and antithetical maxim -
3'actus non facit reum nisi mens rea". The earliest
case, perhaps, i- which the rle is asserted is in
the tLeges Henrici Primi" V. 28, in which the follow-
ing langriage is used,"SI qis per coaccionem abjprare
cogatur uod peimiiltos annos quiete tenuerit, non
in~rart sed cogente perjurium erit. Reum non facit
nisi mens rea. Brown) s Maxims give the errliest
authority cited for its use as 3rd Institute, Chap. .
fo. 10, )hem it appears as a marginal reference by
Lord Coke. Another maxim of the same import is, SAc-
tus me i'nvito factus non est meus actus" an act done
by me against .my '-ill is not my act. This principle
then as promI1lated by theso familiar maxims is im-
mutable in its nature. It is older than the lawv for
from it the lav sprang. Historv records instances
where it has been violated. Siich instances, however,
are traceable to the prejudices and passions of men
rather than them calm and deliberate judf-rements.
W/ith every return of reason; e principle reappears
to assert itself wvith greater power than before. If
legislatures or courts trample dowvn this barrier con-
structed by the guiding hand of right there injustices
will recoil "pon. themselves 'rvith redoubled severity
while their intended victim will be elevatnd to the
Aseat and reputation of a martyr. The same rule
holds in moral science ag well. t"By reference to the
i-nteior. we inculpate or exculpnte others or oursel
ves ,vithout any respect to the happiness or misery
actually prodeed. Let the resIt of an oetion be
'rheat it may, -,e hold . man guilty simply on the ground
of intention; or, on the same ground we holl him in-
nocent. " (VTayland s M,)oral Science. )
This principle is too wrell athorlsed ann sanct-
ioned to need any authorites to svpoort it here.
W1hther like all rulles it may be modified by excep-
tions-e sh al see later. (See generally Bishop' s
Criminal Lav. )
In the soame mann.er that an act iinaccompanie4 by
an intent is 1-npiiishable so is the mete intent beyond
the Surisdiction of terresti.l court.rs The State
Which complains in criminal actions does-"nOt suffer
from the mere imaginings of men and consequently some
act must have followed the wrongful intent. This
principle is illustrated by the cases of Rex vs.
Stewart I. Russ. & Ryan 288 and Rex vs. Fu ller I.
Rus. Ryn 08. This former case was decide.i
Russ.& Rya ...
1814. The prisoner was tried o- a, indit~ment chargring
him with having in his possession a quantity
of counte'rfit coin with the pmrpose of uttering it for
good. The twelve judges, for whom the case was
teserv ,unanimously decided that the mere having in
possession was no crime at the common law in that theee
was no overt act. In the latter case the indictment
charged 'that the defendant with force and arms un-
lawfully did procTre twenty pieces of coilunterfit coin
made to the likeness of good con of this realm, with
intent to itter the same etc. The court, sitting iii
1815 1 unanimously decided that the procuring of such
coin with intent to utter was an offenge. Vhile this
may be considered as draqvnrc the line very fine, never-
the-lesgit wvell illustrates the principle contended
for that a mere intent is not ounishable except as
evidenced by some overt act. Tn the above cases
having 1as held not to be sch overt act wile the
mere procurinrg 7as sufficient that intent might attach
to it constitut!rv an offence. In ,some cases very
insignifican~t acts are held to be sufficient as in
c o'sziracy where the mere conspiring is enoug h.
The remarkable case of the Duke of Norfolk illu.s-
trates from what slight acts intent may be inferred.
The Dike wrote letters to the Queen of Stotland who
previously harl, laid claim to the Enemlish Crown. The
court held that inasmuch as the Queen of Scotland
aspired to 'the throne of England he that married her
must be presumed to claim it also in her behalf, which
claim was inconsistent "vith the safety of the EnFrlish
Q1een. From suich acts the Duke was presumed to have
compassed and imagined the Queen of England) s death.
He was accordingly tried and executed. Thus it 'Till
be seen that some overt act, how,,ever slight, must
exist accompanied by the evil intent. This rille is
solind and salutary for -rere it otherwise the courts
would have to pass upon the state of men) s minds which
wouIrd necessitate the assumption of oTitdience, an
attrtbute of Deity.
Shakespeare, who was more of a jprist than many
professedly so, has aptly statedtlis second underlyincT
and gui ing principle of criminal jurisprudence:
0MIy brother 1hnd but justice,
In that he di,, the thing for vhich he died.
ForAngelo, his act did not 0 ertake his baA! intent,
And must be punished bu]t as an intent
That perished by the way: thoughts are no subjects;
Intents but merely thoughts. "
Since the intent then plays so important a part
let us ascertain hat is meant by the term. To enun-
ciate a definit'ion absolute in its nature is impossible.
7As no tv o crimes are the sare, though similiar in their
nat ire, qo will it be impossible to find twvo minds
and und er e-if ferent c ircumstances, the sarne. Intent
can only be ascertained from a caref-l observation of
all the overt acts that are connected rith the offence.
Intent, hovever, has been defined to be "The setting of
ones self and ones powers to bring about a certain re-
sult" (Clark's Analysis of Criminal Tjiability, p.
73). This is its original, derivative meaning and
from that standpoint is considered good. V1. L. Clark
in his "'Criminal Law" has given the following: " A
criminal intention is the state of mind of a person,
when he consciously violates the law, ,ithout legal
pi. stificat ion or excuse. (page 42)
The failure to dra--rdi t intion between intent
and motive has been the source of mrich litigation and
oonfTI-ion by courts. By motive we mean that power
or action of the mind which incites or stimulates a
person to do or refu~e to do some act. It sho Id
always be kept in mind that, motive is not an essential
element of crime and is n ever, of necessity, proved.
Motive is important i r criminal law% in that it may be
used to showr the intent wvith which an act is done.
8For example, A. shoots and kills B. Evidence is offer-
ed to prove the killing accidental. To rebut this
evidence testimony is offere to show that on a pre-
vious occasion A. had threatened to kill B. Here
the 'motive gill be seen to have been e'il and thus a
presumption mry arise that the act was not accidental
but intended. The hatred itself however of A. aainst
B. is no part of the crime and of it the courts cannot
take jurisdiction.
Neither will a motive, however good or praiseworthy,
exempt one from an illegal act wrongfully committed.
The motive ma~y be a good one and yet the act will in
the eyes of the law be no less criminal. A father
steals bread to save his starving children. No one
will here question the motive and yet the act still
remains larceny. This principle, though at times
it may work injustice, is so,nd and wise. Were the
la,:r otherwise there w~ould be fewv convictions of c rime,
for there are fewv cases in ',hich the extraneous motives
are not mixed up with the particular evil intent. The
Hindu mother casts her infant babe in~o the Gan~es to
appease the gods; the libertine invades the sanctuary
of conjugal life believinc he is rendering_ to society
a benefit; the Morman practiced polvgamy devoutly be-
9lieving, as his r.eligion taught, that the Bible
rdemands itiBooth fled from the "ashington theatre
waving his smoking pistol in the air, uttering that
now famosexpress ,"Sic semper tyrannis" staitly
persisting that he was simply obeying the mandates of
a higher power when he assasinated President Lincoln.
The conscience of the -rongdoer calls these instances
examples of rirhte s dt.y heroically dona; society
calls them crimes.
The contrary arFments are vi6os in that they 
leave out of the qiiesten the idea of government by
law and make each individual' s conscious the sole
and final arbiter of his acts. Should we follo.. such
a rinL we Would sanction an4 allowr to ru.n riot some
of the os t heinous crimes to be found on the Newgate
Calendars of the nations of the ,vorld. Scientific
enthusiasm, thein is no d efense to an inriitpment for
disinterring a corpse; the motive of ridding the com-
minity of a bad man is no defense to homicide. No
matter w hat may he the motive leading to a particular
act, if the act be illegal it is indictable, not'with-
rta~rling that some one or more of the motives may he
meritorious. Thus a cease is found -7rhere a mother and
father cossuIlting the welfare of their child dreme r it
in
better to s nd its litt le soil direct to Heavern than
allowr it to rv n its chance throwh this orld of wick-
edness and woe. They accordin l * did the deed which,
17 their eyes, was rir-hteous and commendable. Never-
theless the Statn called this sacrifice of their lit-
tle Isaac, , irer. (See g-enerally Corn. v --. Cooley
s Pick. 7; Co. v 2-as- 1.22 Ma s. ; U. S. vs.
Harmon 4,5 Fed. Rep. 414; Reynolds vs. TJ. S. 98 U. S.
145; " V~heaton' s Criminal Law'" Vol. I. , Sec. 119;
Clark' s Crimina-l ILas pp. 44l. )
The courts hnvel also laid do-rn certain presnmp-
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tions in criminal prosecutions rhich aid in the consid-
eration of and judgeement upon the gi., 7 facts. "W1hen
one does an unlawfP7l act he is by the law presme
to intend to do it" or as is sometires said, a man
intends his acts. Again, a man is presumed to i"tend
the natural and probable consemien6es of his acts o-,"
the gronnd that these rMist, have been within his contem-
plation if he is same manu and acts " ith the delib-
erat ion which ought to govern men in the conduct of
their affairs. (May' s "Crimina~l Law" Sec. 7, pp.
5-6.) Thee re ho~ever classes of cases where the
particular intent is necessarily proved and tbey are
sich that the act in itself is not criminal and is
II
made so only when such intent is provedr. Ve 7il nOW
consider that cls of cass where the presumption,
namely, that a man intends his acts and the ratural
and probable consenuences of such acts.
In an early case 3 aule a- Selwyn, Kin v .
Vixon Lord Ellenborogh distinctly and unhesitatingly
h d •s t nd anti as eroy'ton~
lair- downn the rule. The defend.t was employedto
furnish bread for the Royal Military Asylim. The4
indictment charged him with adulterating the food and
a motion was then made in arrest of judgement for the
cause that the indictmemt did not show that he intended
to injure the chilrIren s health. Lord Ellenborough
said: "It is an universal principle that when a man
is charged with doing an act of which the probab)le
consequences may be highly injurious the intention is
an inference of lawT resulti-ng from the doirg of the
act and here it was alle7ed that he delivered the
loaves for the use and support of the children. i
Iii the case of U. S. v . Taintor 11 Blatchford the
doctrine is 'iistinctly laid do'; n by the U. S. Circueit
Courts. Here the defendant was charged wvith embez-
zlIing money f rom a bank of - hich he was cashie r. On
his trial in the lower court he offere-, evidence to
12
prove that his acts were known to the presidernt of the
bank and some o- the directors an.d were rarctioned bV
them. This evidence was not offere to disprove his
acts bult to shoir that thern was no intent to dera',d
or injure as chargecl in the indictment. Benedict, J.
said: "One propositio involved is that the guilty
intent charged in the indictment was sho'n by the
proof of tle acts clone. It has hardly bee'? doiibtedl
but that this oroposition is correct. It is a general
r,,le of law that a man rnust be he r1-1 to intend the
necessary consem iences of his acts. This rule is
applicable to criminal cases as well as civil. " His
mot ion was thus lost.
In the case of Com. vr. York 9 Metcalf at p. 107
the court said: "A sane man, a voluntary agent, acting
upon rmotives, must be presumed to intend the natural
and probable conseouencrs of his acts. w4f, there -
fore, one voluntarily and willfily does an act -which
has a direct tendency to destroy another' s life, the
natural and necessary conclusion from suc...h act is that
he intended so to destroy such person3 s li' . " The
d.efendant in this case as char~red-vith commission of
murder, and +he cou.rt lair"d do--n the rule that if it
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were proved he did the act of inflicting a mortal
"'17ond upon the rleceased malice was to be inferred
unless sch acts Twrere proved, by a preponderance of
the evidence as "-roild extenuate the homicide and re-
duce it to manslal,,ghter. See also the familiar case
of Com. vs. Weebster 5 Cuish. at mage 35, where the
rule is approved and strongly reasserted.
From the above cases it is ob-:iotis that in those
jurisdictions there is a Presumption of lar that a
man intends his acts and the natural and probable
conse oences of such acts. This presumption is of
course a rebuttable one by preponderating evidence.
"'e shall now turn oiur attention to the Ne-r York
cases and see whether the rule here is in con lict
vith the great mass o adjudication7 elsewhere.
the case of Stokes vs. People, 53 N. Y., 177, the
defendant was indicted on charge of murder and the
trial judge in his clhrrge to th e jury said: Th.m
fact of the killing in this case being coned:ed, it
becomes the duty of the prisoner here to satisfy you
that it wvas not murder which the law' wvould imply from
the fact of the killing under the c ircumstances, in
the absence of explanation that it rpas manslaughter in
the third degree or justifiable homicide, becaus as I
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have said the fact of killing being conceded a-d the
law implying motive from the circumstinces of the case7
the prosecutors case is clearly and entirely made
out and therefore you can havve no reasona.le doubt as
to that, unless the prisoner shpll give evidence sfe-
fic ient to satisfy vou that it lwaps j-1stifiable muirder
under the circumstances of the case. "  On the apperl
0rovC5I J held tha.t to say that there arises a legal
implication. prom the fact of killing in the absence of
proof exte-nuating the circumstances was error and that
while such charge was correct at comnon larv by the
New York statiite was wvholly wrorg. RThe aruestion i,
this case is not w7hpt aS the rule at comnon lav as to
the implication of malice from the act whether sicn
rule is dediced from authority or principle and legal
analogies . The Q.estion arises upon the statutes of
the state by rhich homicide is m:de justifiable or
excusable, miirder in the first or second dree or
manslaughter in one o? four degrees, .ete.i.. byth
intention and c ircum.stances of its perpetration. U
This opinion argu.es tha~t the c~ime consists o an act
and an in nt -rhich must concur e~'d it is therefore
impossibel to convict unless both exist. The inten-
tion may be inferred from the act but this i pr3n-
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ciple is an inference of ftet to be drawn by the jury
and not an implication or law to be applied by the
court, At the common la'r this presumption was one
of la-7 applied by the cou-rt -v'hile here it is a pre-
sumption of fact to be drawvn by the jury rhich amounts
to nothing£ more nor less than an argument. It should
be remembered however that this is so from the nature
of the statte.
In People vs. Polwell the rdefendants were charged
with conspiracy. They had neglected to advertise
for proposals for supplies for the iuse of the poor of
Kings County as renuired by statute. The defendants
o fered evideice to sho,-r that they acted in good faith,
did not knoirr of the statute and tha+ there was no in-
tention to violate the statute. The trial judge held
that ignorance of law or absence of intent-would not
avail the defence and if they did the act prohibited
by statute or omitted to ro that whinh was so required,
they wrere guilty. This charge on appeal was held to
be erroneous in that the intent was not to be inferred
as aL ma er of lawv but wvas to be proved as well as the
act itself.
In Filkins vg. People 69 N. Y. 101, the court held
that whenever the degree of the offense dependr upon
16
the particular intent with which an act is done the
intent to be inferred from the c ircimstances is for
the jury and every fact which will throw light upon
that question may be given in evidence.
I People vs. Flack 125 N. Y. 324, the daefe'ndants
were charged vith conspiracy. Andrews J. , speaking for
the coiort said: "The presurnption that a person intends
the ordinary and probable conseruences of his acts is,
as applied to criminal ceases, a rule to aid the jury in
reaching a conclusion upon a question of fact and is
not a presumption of law. " No matter how clear and
incontrovertIble the proof may be as showing a crim-
inal intention, still the o-uestion remains for the
jury and must be passed upon by them alone anf1 never
can be ruled as a question o1 law by the court.
"Jurors may be perverse4, the ends of Justice may be
defeated by unrighteous verdicts, but so long as the
function of the judge and jury are distinct, the onr
responding to the la:'4 the other to the - ac .+s neither
can invade the province of the other W4ithout Aestroy~
ing of trial by court and jury. "
In the case of W~imai vs. People reported in 32
N. Y. Sup. 1037 and in 9 I{isc. Reports one decision
based on an argument for statv of proceedings we find
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the N. Y. doctrine stoutly adhered to by the General
Term. Vimar aPchrg: ).rged-7ith forgery. From the
evidece it appeared that d-fendant 1vas a ithorized to
dra r checks in the name of his employer. He did dra'
a check payable to a crr4itor of the i irm acd the
indorsed the payee' s n-me upon the back. The object
of drawin--. the check and making it payable to the cre1 -
itor -ras not to -)e-raud his employer but merely to
conce l his overdrafts or the appropriation of his em-
ployer) s money to his o' rn use. The General Term in
both cases held that the act itself 'gas not sifficient
to convict him of forgery, instead of being presumed
from the act as a question of Iawwas one to be passed
u!pon py t1e j'ry.
Let us keep ou r mind upon these cases while re
consider that class of cases where the act having been
done an. proved t hera arises an irrebut~ble presumption
that there , as a criminal intention. egisltres
have po',rer to pass statutes the violation of wrhich is
a, :ays f ollovec by the penalty regardless of the state
of te ofen ,'ers mind at the time. (People vs.
Kiber 1 N. Y., 21) A statute may, for i'-stnce,
!rou e milk to b up to a certab st Andard an the
mere act of selling milk ot -p to the s+.ndn,.rd is
i8
ground for convictioo regardless of intent. Evidence
howing that he acted pridently and actually believe?
that the milk -ras pure would'be of no avail. The act
alone being proved criminal intent is irrebutablv
presumed. (People vs. Kihlrr, 16, N. Y. 1
Legislatures may also auithoratively determine the
ristance rithin wvhich pow der maga'ines and slauhcnter
houses "co be erected from cities.
In State vs. Essex C117b 20 At. R. 770 the facts
-,-ere these: A bona fide social club out of its common
fund purchased liaior and sold t'em to the members ofn
such c lub. The statute .claimed to be violated nras as
ollo s "hoever rahall sell any stron. or siritous
liquor at any time and at any place within said city
without having a lieen, se therefor, shall forelit and
pay fifty dollars for each offense. " This was held to
be one of that class of cases which does not depend
upon the intent offender. "I this class of eases
the offense consists in the act done, regardless of
the intent 1 ith which it. is done. In my juri gement
it i Tholy imateial nd rot a legitimate subject of
inquiry whether an i-tention to violate or evade the
la7- was present or not. Intent con stittes 0o part
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of the offense. The simple question presented is
did he do the act expressly irnhibited. " If so the
Conviction is -ell grounded.
Ir Uaisted vs. State, 32 A. Re , 2'-5the-principle
is a lealy enu-ciatfd ,nd authoritie, s cited an-d dis-
s ssed. To.enever the IOr positively borbirls an act to
be done, it becomes thereu1po ipso facto illegral to
o it villfnly or in some cases even ignorartly or may
be to effect an ulterior laudible ob1ject" ard t-ere
ma, y be ain indictmet wtithout the a !cition of any cor-
rilpt motive. "Nothing in la is more in01ontestable
than that in stattutory crimes the maxim that crime
only proceeds fIom criminal minds does not apply.
Hei'e then-re have the vrle - as a corollarv or
modification of the orincioln that a man intends the
natural a, nd probable consequences of his act - that
in some cases where the crimes are prohibited the
intent is a question Of fact for the ury, and second,
that where the statute expressly and positively forbids
an act to be done the mere c4oing is sufficient ground
upon which to base a conviction regardless of the
intent.
Thus it will be seen that not a great pessimistic
turn of mind is required to foresee and expect trouble
20
ahead of us.. The different cases founded upon very
siriliar facts apparently diverge leading us on until
we are utterly lost a.d beTildered standing in a
*io,, ldrrz fc lasbnir!7j iristic Qpirions. to n a
earef,.l examinat ot% of all these case s we shall fInd
that they an be reconciled and that all thn decisions
are controlled by the fundamental principle of stau-
tory const.c.tion. Let tlp intent of the enacting
body be ascertained ana such intent if legitimate,
justifiable and -rrithi constituitional sanction shall
control, let the consequences be "-hat they ray.
VIe will n o1 consider a few i11Ystrat ve cases.
In (ood'-ow vs. State 65 M-e. ?r),a a roman married a
scond time, believing that she had been legally ab-
solved from her first hnsband by divorce. This was
held to be no deferse to the statute which was general
in its nature.
Ir Comr. vs. Nas's 7 Metcalf 472 a womanr married a
second time, believing from his long ab~sen~ce etc. that
her first husband was dead. Not- ilonred as a defense.
In, Queen- vs. Tolson: 2? Q. B. Div. 168 the facts
and, statut e were similiar to those in the Nash case
and while a different conclusion war' reached both
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decisions went upon the ascertainment of the construle-
tion theory already laid do-n. No case probably can.
be found holdinr that in case of a gereral prohibiotry
statuTte a corrupt motive must be interpolated into the
statute to e onstituite the offence or) the ground as
is sometimes claimed that otherwise it would be con-
trary to natural ju.tice. (Halsted vs. State, 32 A.
R. , 245) If this riile be followued all the cases
become harmonized and apparent inconsisteneies are
scattered and disappear.
As tc unintended results. If a oerso- . intending
to do some unla ful act and wrongrul, commits some
crime acci-entaly he is nevertheless held guilty.
Thus if A. shoots at B. to kill him and accidentally
kills C. A. will be guilty of rur:er. I . Corn. vs.
Mink 123 Mass. 422 the defendant was about to commit
suicide and one to whom she was engaged attempted to
prevent her and w:ras thus shot. Here the defendant
was foun4' guilty of rnansla ,ghter. The crime intended
to be done howvever must he malum ir se and not merely
malvim prohibitum. (Corn. vs. Adams, ll' M }as s. , 323. )
In Rex vs. Blackburn, 2 past P. C. 711 the defen-
dant attempted to commi rapes up.o.n a -non a. she
22
offe re r him money if he woulc desist. This was held
to be robbery though his original intention was to com-
mit rape. This of course would not be so helg Pi
New York.
In this thesis the principles discussed are
pri:cipally the following: That no man can be convicted
of a crime unless his intent is evil; That a mere in-
tent except as evidene,d by some overt act is unpuhish-
able; That a man is presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequences of his acts as ,rell as the acts
themselves;:T-at under the New-r York statutes the rule
is modified to the effect that tle intent is never
presumed as a qestion of law but as a ci'estion of
fact to be passed upo by the jury; That where the in-
tent is an ingredient of the crime it mu.st be proved
and can never be presimed; That the LegislAtvre has
au.thority to make certain acts criminal and in. such
cases there is an irrebuta~1e presumption of criminal
intention; That a man is liable for his unintend ed
acts where such are the effects or results o f an in-
tended wrongful act.
7Y C4
